THE NATURE OF THE DOCTRINAL FUNCTION AND ITS ROLE IN RATIONTAL THOUGHT CASSIUS J. KEYSER *
IT is the aim of this paper to answer the following two questions: What is a Doctrinal Function? What is the essential r6le of doctrinal functions in logical discourse?
It is assumed that for the most part the bearings of the discussion upon the study of legal science will be sufficiently obvious without special or explicit indication.
In order that the answers may be made sufficiently definite and clear it seems desirable or even necessary to begin by indicating the senses in which certain cardinal terms, some of them familiar and some of them unfpmiliar, are to be uniformly employed throughout. Among such terms are variable, function, value of a variable or of a function, proposition, propositional function, propositional content or subject-matter, propositional form, postulate, postulate system or set, implication, implier, implicate, hypothetical proposition or propositional form, categorical proposition or propositional form, and a variety of subsidiary terms closely connected with the foregoing ones.
The Idea of a Variable
In human discourse, whatever be the subject or the field, hardly any notion occurs more frequently than that of variable and hardly any term is more familiar. The fact is not at all astonishing, for discourse is necessarily a more or less faithful mirror of the world, and the world, as every one knows, is a locus of ubiquitous and ceaseless change or variation. But it is somewhat astonishing that in discourse it is almost always tacitly assumed, both by the speaker or the writer and by the hearers or the readers, that the meaning of the term variable is so obvious as to require no explanation whatever. It has very seldom occurred to anyone to question seriously the validity of that almost universal assumption, and so the literature aiming to tell precisely what it is that the term variable signifies, or ought to be understood as signifying, is exceedingly meager. Yet no one can reflect, even a little, upon the question of the term's Adrain Professor of Mathematics, Columbia University.
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YALE LAW JOURNAL meaning without discovering two facts: that the question is fundamentally important and that it is very difficult. Though I cannot undertake to deal with it quite adequately here, I venture to hope that the following brief discussion of it may not be entirely unprofitable.
Concerning Symbols
It is necessary to begin by thinking a little about the nature of symbols, for we are going to see that, whatever the essential significance of the term variable may be, a variable is, in discourse, always a symbol. The symbol may be any familiar or unfamiliar word or any combination of words, as a phrase or a sentence, or it may be x or y or z or any other mark or combination of marks. The first thing to.get clear is that a symbol symbolizes and that whatever symbolizes symbolizes something. To speak as if there could be a non-symbolizing symbol or as if there could be symbolizing without symbolizing anything is to utter sheer nonsense-nonsense of the sort that implicitly involves a contradiction in terms. One could as rationally speak of the possibility of remembering without remembering anything or of losing without losing anything or of eating without eating anything or of supposing without making any hypothesis. Instead of uniformly saying that such-and-such is what a given symbol symbolizes, it will often be convenient to follow usage and say that such-and-such is what the symbol denotes or means or stands for or represents.
Again, it is of the utmost critical importance to see clearly, and to keep steadily in mind, the fact that the symbolic character of a symbol is never intrinsic or inherent in it. Although it is true that anything whatever may be employed as a symbol, yet no thing ever is or can be a symbol except when and so long as it is employed as such. In other words, all the symbols that. occur in human discourse are man-made-that is, man-chosen or man-invented for the purpose-and the meaning of any symbol is man-given, or man-assigned. If I be one of the legion who either in their theory deny the fact stated or in their practice ignore it and violate it, then I belong to the immense logolatrous class of mankind, I belong to the superstitious multitude of symbol-worshippers, I have not yet achieved emancipation from the ages-old world-wide tyranny of verbal magic.
What a given symbol denotes or represents may be one and but one object of thought or of sense or it may be 'any one' (but not a specific or chosen one) of two or more such objects.' Let As here used the familiar phrase 'any one' is absolutely indispensable but its meaning is exceedingly subtle. For a discussion of it I may refer the reader to my MATHEMATICAL PpiLosoPrIY (1922) 235-239. [Vol. 41 me exemplify these two types of symbols. Suppose the symbol to be the figure 5, say, or the word five, or the numerical symbol 7, or the name Mahatma Gandhi or 'present king of England' or 'Newtonian law of gravitation' or x in the expression, an integer x greater than 10 and less than 12, or P in the expression, let P be a point common to a given pair of intersecting lines. It is evident that in all such examples what the symbols represent is one and but one thing. On the other hand, suppose the symbol to be such a word as law ofr land or love or God or god or Devil or devil or mind or relation or joy or evil or poet or justice or ethic or contract or religion or tort or circle or x in the expression, let x be a number greater than 10, or P in the expression, let P be a point in the earth's orbit. It is obvious that in every such case what the symbol stands for is 'any one' (but no specific one) of two or more things.
We are now prepared to define the term variable, or at least to describe the term's meaning with a good deal of precision: A variable is a, symbol so employed, as to rcpresczt any onze of two or more objects. It is evident that any mark or any term in speech may be made to play the part of a variable. What is more important to observe is the fact, which no competent critic can fail to discover, that in human discourse, even the most exact, the occurrence of variables is vastly more frequent than speakers or writers or hearers or readers commonly suppose. It need hardly be said that a symbol occurring in two discourses may be a variable in one of them without being such in the other.
To any given variable there corresponds a class of objects such that the variable represents 'any one' of them. That class of objects is called the variable's range. The objects composing the range are the variable's values or, as one might say, its meanings. A few simple examples will help to clarify. The range of the variable x in the expression 3x is the class of things such that each of them admits of being multiplied by three; that is, the range of the variable's values is the class of all numbers. Even if we suppose the terms point and line to have been completely defined, the statement, two points determine a line, contains two variables, point and line; the range of the former is the class of all the points of space and that of the latter is the totality of the lines of space. Again, consider such statements as these: God is love; knowledge is good; the aim of education is preparation for life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The first has two variables, God and love; also the second, knlowledge and good; the third has at least four, education, life, liberty and happiness. The range of values of any given one of them comprises all and only such diverse meanings as men have attached or may attach to the corresponding term. Like examples abound on every hand.
The Function Concept
The name Function, it is said, was first pronounced by Leibnitz. The idea denoted by it is, at least in rudimentary form, far older than the name-as old no doubt as human reflection upon human experience. Since the time of Leibnitz the idea has so grown and developed in importance and power that the function concept may now be said, without exaggeration, to have attained supremacy alike in the enterprise of mathematics and in that of science. In that fact there is nothing to astonish. For regarding mathematics and science one can say, with a very fair approximation to truth, that these two great knowledge-seeking enterprises are both of them sustained by a common hope-the hope of discovering uniformities in the processes by which, in our world, change begets change. And it is doubtless from the universally observed fact, or seeming fact, of such begetting that the notion of function has sprung.
What is the meaning of the term function as employed in mathematics and in the physical sciences and, I may add, as it is or may be employed in the social sciences including the science of law? The answer must be given in terms of variables and of relations among them. Perhaps nothing is more familiar than the fact that two or more variables may be so related or connected that each of them depends, as we say, upon the others, as the circumference of a circle depends upon the length of the radius, as the enforceability of a municipal law depends upon the law's relation to the people's will, as the volume of a gas depends upon temperature and pressure, and so on endlessly. All such examples illustrate functionality or functional relationship. But to define the term function it is necessary to be more precise. In the interests of clarity it seems best to define it first in terms of two variables and subsequently in terms of two or more.
The first definition is: If two variables are so related that to each value of either there corresponds, in a definite way, at least one value of the other, each of the variables is called a function of the other. Consider, for example, 3x; here x is a variable and so is 3x; for conv enience denote 3x by y and set y=3x; plainly to each value of x or y there corresponds a value of y or x; hence x and y are each a function of the other. So are r and s if r be the radius and s be the surface of a sphere. So, too, are x and y in y 2 = 4x, 2 Thus, if v be the volume of a parallelepiped, say a slab, and if 1, b and t be respectively its length, breadth, and thickness, each of the four variables is a function of the remaining three. In x+2y-3z+8y --10z 3 +w +12=0 each of the variables is clearly a function of the rest. Obviously there are countless cases in which one may know that a functional relationship exists though no one has yet been able to formulate it with precision. For example, as every one knows, the prosperity of a given agricultural community is a function of such variables as climate, soil fertility, market availability, implemental equipment, the experience of the people, their diligence, their intelligence, their energy, and other variables. For another example, consider medicine. It is a mattei of common knowledge that medical theory or medical practice is a function of numerous variables including such as chemical knowledge, the science of physics, biological science, psychological discovery, and so on. Doubtless the veracity of many a one is a function of such variables as the veracity of his friends and neighbors, his sense of honor, his courage, his fear, his vanity, his cupidity, and the like. Again, it requires no very extraordinary degree of intelligence but only a little attention to see that the municipal law of a community, a state or a nation, is not only a variable but is a function of many other variables, as modes and forms of business, for example, manners, customs, mores, religious opinion and feeling, scientific discovery, invention, applications of science, industrial development, ethical sentiment, political theory, and others. Wherever we look we discover functional relationships. They are literally ubiquitous. Under scrutiny the universe appears as an immense locus or embodiment of functions. To discover and to formulate them with-a view to understanding and controlling the world is the supreme aim of science if not the dominant concern of man.
Propositional Functozs
Consider the statement S:
x is a commandment of the Decalogue. Regarding S it is important to note carefully the following facts:
(1) S contains a variable x; (2) S, though it has the form of a proposition, is not a proposition, for a proposition is a statement that is true or else false, but, as no definite value or signification has been assigned to "., S is not such a statement; it is, properly speaking, neither true nor false; (3) Though S is not itself a proposition, it is a matrix or a source whence many propositions, some true, some false, may be derived by assigning to x or substituting for it now one and now another of its possible values. Thus on replacing x by Thou shalt not kill or by Thou shalt not bear false witness, or by Thou shalt not drink wine or by Thou shalt not take a bath, we obtain one or another of four definite propositions, two of them true, two of them false.
(4) Among definite terms-terms each denoting one and but one thing-there are many which, if substituted for x, yield, not propositions, but sheer non-sense. Such a term is the term, The Decalogue. Substituting it for x, we get the statement, The Decalogue is a commandment of the Decalogue, which is not a proposition but is a species of non-sense-the kind of non-sense that consists in speaking as if a class of things could be a member of itself, as if, for example, the class of locomotives were itself a locomotive, or as if the class of apples or of asses were itself an apple or an ass. To speak thus is merely to jabber. So it is seen that the range of the values of x is limited-many things are excluded as yielding, not propositions, but non-sense.
(5) The range of the values of x comprises all and only such definite somewhats that replacing x by any one of them yields a proposition (true or else false).
The foregoing statement S is a simple example of what is known as a Propositional Function, a weighty term invented and introduced into the vocabularies of science and mathematics by Mr. Bertrand Russell. The given specimen contains but one variable of the type above characterized. But a propositional function may involve any given number of such variables. A simple specimen involving five of them is the statement, x reported that y discovered that z bore the relation R to iv. I-low may the general concept, above exemplified, be defined? I believe the following definition to be fairly precise and clear: . It is necessary to guard against being deceived by superficial semblance. A statement may have the outward appearance of a propositional function without being one. Consider the following-statements: [Vol. 41 (1) John Doe murdered Richard Roe; (2) Richard Roe is not dead and never has been; (3) John Doe murdered some one who is not dead and never has been; (4) Everyx is a y; (5) Every y is a z; (6) Every x is a z; (7) If John Doe murdered Richard Roe and Richard Roe is not dead and never has been, then John Doe murdered some one who is not dead and never has been; (8) If every x is a y and every y a z, then every -,, is a z. The first six of the statements obviously satisfy both of the conditions (a) and (b) and so are propositional functions. But neither (7) nor (8), despite the presence in them of the variables John Doe, Richard Roe, x, y, and z, is such a function, for neither of them satisfies condition (a). They fail to satisfy it for the reason that, as a keen glance suffices to show, each of them is, just as it stands and -without regard to any particular values of the variables, a genuine proposition. It happens, moreover, though this is not essential, that the two propositions are true. The fact that such statements as (7) and (8) are not propositional functions but are definite propositions merits the closest attention. It is evident that (7) is intended to be equivalent to (9) 'John Doe murdered Richard Roe' and 'Richard Roe is not dead and never has been' imply 'John Doe murdered one who is not dead and never has been', and that (8) is equivalent to (10) 'Every . is a y' and 'every y is a z' imply 'everyx is a z'. So it is seen that what (7) or (8) or (9) or (10) asserts is an implication. That the assertions, notwithstanding the presence of variables in them, are not propositional functions but are propositions is due to a fact than which nothing in the theory of rational discourse is more fundamentally important: I mean the fact that logical implication, whenever it holds, holds between the forms of statements quite independently of their contfnts if they happen to have content. Any reader who grasps that fact will instantly see that (7), (8), (9), and (10) are, as asscrtions, absolutely unaltered by replacing their variables by any definite particular values.
The Values of Propositio wl Fumctions
From that cautionary digression, I now return to the consideration of propositional functions. The values of the variables of a given propositional function fall into two mutually exclusive classes, those which, on being substituted for the variables, yield It is perhaps worth while to point out a distinction which, though it is pretty obvious, might nevertheless be harmfully overlooked. The distinction is this: the general term, a propositional function, is a variable whose range of values is the class of specific propositional functions, while any given one of the specific propositional functions is a variable whose range of values is the class of propositions derivable from it in the way already explained and exemplified. The propriety of calling a propositional function by that name obviously rests upon two considerations: one of them is that each of the things so named is a variable depending upon one or more other variables; and the other one is that the values of that variable are propositions.
Frequency of Propositional Functions
There is no limit to the number or to the variety of propositional functions that either exist or can be invented. Their occurrence is by no means confined to the literature of what is commonly called mathematics and the literature of what is commonly called science. On the contrary, they are to be found in all ostensibly rational discourse no matter what its subject or field. For it must not be supposed that the variables of a propositional function are always such marks as x, y, z, etc. Indeed they are, more frequently, ordinary words of familiar speech. Consider, for example, the statement, God is love.
If, as frequently happens, that statement occurs in a discourse in which there is no indication of the senses in which the terms God and love are to be understood, then, in and for that discourse, the statement is exactly equivalent to the statement x is y, and, in the interest of clarity, might as well or better be replaced by it. If, as also frequently happens, the discourse affords some indication of the senses in question but not sufficient indication to identify them, then the terms are still variables, not quite so obviously but just as genuinely variables as under the former supposition. It is clear that in the one case as in the other, the statement in question is, in and for the discourse in which it occurs, not a proposition but is a propositional function, and, being such, is neither true nor false but has numerous values, some of them proper, some of them improper, according as they are true propositions or false ones.
What has just been said of the assertion, God is love, evidently is, mutatis 'mutandis, no less valid for such a statement as Knowledge is a good, or Communism is a magnificent experiment, or Universal education is essential to the prosperity of genuine democracy, or Science and religion are compatible, or "A law is a rule of action prescribed by the supreme power of a state commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong," or "Equity is the correction of that wherein the law by reason of its universality is defective," and so on and on. Any student who has grasped the concept, propositional function, and who, if he have not done so before, proceeds to examine some treatise, almost any treatise, in his field, whether it be law or economics or medicine or theology or ethics or art or philosophy or physical science or any other, with a view to noting the occurrence or non-occurrence of propositional functions in the work will be astounded to find that a great majority of the author's statements, though regarded by him as propositions and intended to be so regarded by his readers, are in fact not propositions at all but are genuine propositional functions. Indeed it is not extravagant to say that what mainly fills the books of the world's libraries is not propositions, whether true or false, not proper or improper values of propositional functions, but propositional functions themselves. That fact, almost universally unrecognized or ignored, probably goes further than any other single fact to account for the endless disputations of men, for it is probably true that nothing else is so prolific a source of disputation as propositional functions regarded by mankind as propositions and so as true or else false while in fact they are neither.
So it is seen that propositional functions may be employed either unconsciously or consciously. When employed unconsciously, as for the most part they have been and are, when employed, I mean, in the belief that they are propositions and so have the quality of being true or else false, they produce all manner of misunderstanding, lead to unending disputation, and thus work immeasurable harm. On the other hand, the conscious use of propositional functions as such is not only highly advantageous but often absolutely indispensable in research, in the formulation of its results, and in criticism of all such literature as either is, or aims at being, discourse of reason. Both of the facts just stated, and especially the latter one, will become increasingly evident in the light of the following discussion.
Concerning Postulates
In the course of the centuries the term postulate has been employed in a variety of closely related but differing senses. 2 In the present article I will employ it uniformly in accord with what I deem the best usage of modern mathematicians and men of science. What, then, are we to understand by the term postulate?
The reader knows that many a discourse contains no logical proof of any of its statements; he knows that no discourse can prove all of its statements; and he knows that, if a discourse proves some of its statements, it contains also some unproved statements that imply the proved ones and from which these have been logically deduced. In such a discourse the impliers are postulates.
The matter may be stated more precisely as follows. Given a discourse that proves some of its statements; denote by C the class of all the proved statements; among the unproved statements there are some statements-call the class of them C'-that together imply the statements of C and from which these have been derived by logical deduction. In and for the given discourse, the statements composing the class C' are postulates.
Finally, the term postulate may be yet more precisely, even if not more clearly, defined in the following form.
In and for a given discourse a statement S occurring in it is a postulate if and only if S satisfies the following three conditions: (a) S occurs without proof or attempted proof; (b) S is a member of a class of statements of the discourse that imply other statements of it; (c) S is actually used as an implier in the discourse-that is, from S (taken alone or in conjunction with other impliers) the discourse deduces, or endeavors to deduce, one or more of its statements.
Sacrificing some precision for the sake of brevity we may say that for a statement to be a postulate it is necessary and sufficient that it be unproved, that it be an implier, and that it be employed as such.
It should be added that in our time the terms postulate, axiom, assumption, and primitive proposition are uniformly employed, at least by critical mathematicians, quite interchangeably as exact synonyms. It has not always been so. The reader is doubtles's aware of the fact that in former times the term axiom 2 If any readers of this article chance to be interested in the history of the term postulate and its kind they may be referred to the Introduction to Dr. T. L. Heath's edition of EucLm's ELEMENTS, where, as I have elsewhoro said, "terms and kindred matters are set in the bright light of critical commentary from the days of Plato down to the present time."
[Vol. 41 was employed to signify a "self-evident or necessary truth," it being then generally believed that there are such truths in contradistinction from such as are not "self-evident" or "necessary" but require proof. 3 
Postulate Systems or Sets
A postulate is one thing; a system of postulates is another. What are we to understand by a postulate system? It is necessary to consider this question very carefully, for a thorough understanding of the term postulate system is indispensable if one is to grasp firmly the significance of the term Doctrinal Function when, at a later stage of this preparatory discussion, the meaning of that term shall have been defined.
Suppose given a collection of postulates. These may be compatible (consistent) or incompatible (inconsistent); they may be compendent (connected) or incompendent (unconnected); they may be dependent or independent. What do the adjectives signify? The postulates of a collection are said to be compatible if and only if none of them contradicts another one; they are said to be compendent if and only if they are concerned with a set of mutually related, or interrelated, variables; and they are said to be independent if and only if none of them is logically implied by one or more of the others.
We are now prepared to define the term postulate system or set. The definition is this: A postulate systcm or set is a collection of postulates that are both compatible. and compcndcnt. Independence, though desirable, is not essential.
The concept just now defined is by no means quite so easy to appropriate as it may seem to be. We can greatly improve our understanding of it by taking the pains to examine attentively some of the typical features of a concrete example or specimen. Postulate systems abound, some of them very carefully devised by mathematicians and employed by them with much formality and much regard for rigor, and some of them less carefully devised, and employed with less formality and less regard for rigor, by non-mathematicians. For our present purpose it will be best to select a specimen of the foriner kind, with the understanding that, though the specimen is taken from elementary mathematics, what will be said of it as a system will be valid for all postulate systems whatever. The specimen I have selected has world-wide fame. It is the system devised by Professor David Hilbert to serve as a basis for Euclidean geometry and is found in his Foundations of Geometry. Hilbert's postulates-called axioms by him-are 21 in number. It will be sufficient to state the following five of them.
(1) Two distinct points determine a line.
(3) Three non-collinear points determine a plane.
(7) Every straight line contains at least two points; every plane at least three points; and space at least four points not in one plane.
(10) Of any three collinear points, one and but one is between the other two.
(15) If a line-segment is congruent to each of two other segments, these are congruent to each other.
The Hilbert system is here adduced solely as a typical representative of postulate systems in general. The following brief study of it has for its aim to exhibit, somewhat concretely, notable properties belonging to all postulate systems. For the sake of emphasis and lucidity such common properties will be stated in italics.
From the postulates of the Hilbert system it is possible, as the author has shown, to deduce logically all of the theorems of Euclidean geometry; in other words, the theorems are logically implied by the postulates, the postulates being the impliers (or hypotheses) and the theorems their implicates (or conclusions).
The corresponding general fact is this: The postulates of any given system logically imply a body of other statements, which may be rightly called theorems; the relation of the postulates to the theorems being that of impliers to their implicates.
In the foregoing statement of Hilbert postulates I have italicised six words: point, line, plane, space, between, and congruent, of which the last two evidently denote relations. I have done so for the reason that these terms are what the postulates are ostensibly assertions about. Professor Hilbert has deliberately refrained from explicitly telling the reader, or trying to tell him, what any one of the terms in question is to represent. The six words, thus deliberately left undefined, are variables. The proper values of the variables are such and only such as verify, or satisfy, the postulates-they are such, that is, that substitution of a properly selected set of them for the variables yields propositions that are true. It is not very difficult to show, and in my Mathematical Philosophy I have shown, that the proper values are of different types, some of them geometric, some of them arithmetical or numerical, and some of them neither the one nor the other. So it is seen that the Hilbert postulates are not propositions, as they are often and quite misleadingly said to be, but are propositional functions, whose variables have for proper values any and all such as verify the functions. The general fact, thus exemplified by a special case, may be briefly enunciated In the theorems deducible from the Hilbert postulates there occur, in addition to the six undefined terms above noted, many defined terms, such as angle, triangle, rectangle, circle, sphere, and so on. But every defined term is defined, directly or indirectly, by means of the six undefined terms. These, we have seen, are variables. It follows that any defined term is also a variable essentially dependent on the fundamental six. It is thus evident that the theorems are, ultimately, assertions about the variables found in the postulates and are, like the latter, not propositions, but propositional functions. Inasmuch as the postulates imply the theorems, it is obvious that verifiers of the former are also verifiers of the latter. Owing to the fact that in the Hilbert discourse the six postulate symbols-point, line, plane, space, between, congruent-are, as already indicated, employed throughout as variables, we may, without the slightest gain or loss of generality, replace them respectively by x, y, z, w, r and e, or by any other meaningless marks. That what I have just said is literally and strictly true may be at first a bit difficult to see, for the terms point, line, etc., are so very familiar that it requires some effort to avoid regarding them as having some inherent or intrinsic meaning of their own, which they have not. If we make the indicated substitutions, the foregoing Hilbert postulates will then stand as follows:
(1) Two distinct x's determine a y. (3) Three x's not belonging to a same y determine a z.
(7) Every y contains at least two -'s; every z at least three x's not belonging to a same y; and w at least four x's not belonging to a same z.
(10) Of any three xo's belonging to a y, one and but one has the relation r to the other two.
(15) If a y-segment has the relation 21 to each of two other y-segments, then these have the relation r' to each other. And so on for the rest of the twenty-one postulates.
It is sufficiently obvious that such a substitution made in the postulates gets itself thereby automatically extended throughout the whole discourse growing out of them and resting upon them. Thus all definitions get restated in terms of the variables ., y, z, w, r and r'. Though not logically necessary, it would be desirable to replace the old names of defined terms by new names or other symbols. And all theorems would get restated in terms of the new names or new symbols and the variables x, y, z, etc. But the relation of logical implication between the restated postulates and the restated theorems would remain exactly what it was before the substitution; in other words, the restated theorems would be deducible from the restated postulates without the slightest alteration of logical process. The importance of that fact is supreme, resting, as it does, upon the sovereign principle, which I have already signalized, that the relation of logical implication, or deducibility, when it holds, holds between the forms of propositional functions, quite independently of their seeming content, or seeming subject-matter, quite independently, that is, of their variables, it being these that give the pure forms the semblance of having content. The foregoing considerations have been adduced, not to prove, but to illustrate and render intelligible, the following momentous fact: Finally, it is necessary to attend carefully to the distinctions signified by the adjectives, Hypothetical and Categorical. A proposition having the form, P implies T, or one admitting of statement in that form, is hypothetical, the implier P being commonly called the hypothesis, and the implicate T the consequence or conclusion. All other propositions are categorical; in other words, a categorical proposition is one that does not assert an implication. Such a proposition is always a value of a propositional function. For example, the categorical proposition, the specific gravity of iron is greater than that of water, is a proper [Vol. 41 value of the propositional function, the specific gravity of x is greater than that of y. The two forms are identical; and so we will say that propositional functions are also categorical.
It is common, always possible, and often convenient to put a hypothetical proposition, P implies T, in the form: if P, then T. But here one must be cautious, for many a categorical proposition is stated in the if-then form. A simple example is: if it lightens, then it will thunder. This is categorical, not hypothetical, for in asserting it we do not mean to assert that 'it will thunder' is deducible logically from 'it lightens'. It may be that thunder does always follow lightning, but, if so, the fact can become known only by observation, not by deduction. Another example is the following if-then statement of Euclid: If the square on one side of a triangle is equal to the sum of the squares on the other sides, then the triangle is right-angled. This is categorical, not hypothetical. For Euclid is not asserting, and it is indeed not true, that the "then" clause is logically implied by the "if" clause. What he is asserting, and what is true, is that the whole if-then statement is a logical implicate of the postulates of his geometry. So it is evident that the form, P implies T, is the best form, and ought to be adopted as the standard form, for asserting hypothetical propositions.
It is essential to perceive that the truth or falsity of a hypothetical proposition depends solely on its form, and that the truth or falsity of a categorical proposition depends on its content. For example, the hypothetical proposition, 'x is greater than y' implies 'x+z is greater than y+z', and the hypothetical proposition, '5 is greater than 7' implies '6 is greater than 8', are both of them true because of form, regardless of content; while the hypotheticals, 'x is greater than y' implies "a+z is greater than y+2z', '5 is greater than 4' implies '5+1 is greater than 4+2', are both false on account of form, regardless of content. But the categoricals, 2±5=7, 2+5=9, are respectively true and false in virtue of content only; while, ,-y=z, though categorical, is neither true nor false, being a propositional function.
What Doctrbw Fuznctiozs Are
We are now at length prepared to define, and (I hope) to understand, the meanings of the term Doctrinal Function. I have used the plural and said "meanings" because, as we are soon to see, doctrinal functions are of two types, which, though intimately related, are yet radically distinct. It will presently be seen, too, that doctrinal functions of the one type may, with nice propriety, be described as hypothetical, and those of the other type as categorical. It will be best, because clearer, to define the two types separately, as follows: A glance suffices to show three noteworthy facts: (1) A doctrinal function of hypothetical type is composed of hypothetical propositions, while one of categorical type is composed of propositional functions, and these, we have seen, are categorical in form; (2) In the former case the constituent propositions are not a mere collection but are so tied together logically as to constitute an indissoluble organic whole, and in the latter case the component propositional functions, far from being a mere ensemble, are doubly bound together by the fact that their variables are all of them interrelated and by the further fact that, though there is present no assertion of implication, yet some of the component functions do in fact imply all the rest; (3) The two types of doctrinal functions are so related that it is impossible to construct one of hypothetical, type without at the same time constructing one of categorical type, but the converse is not true, for it is conceivable that one might assemble a set of propositional functions such that a few of them imply all the rest and nothing else without being aware of the fact of such implication, but the occurrence of such an event, though possible, is extremely improbable.
In constructing a doctrinal function of hypothetical type, the constituent propositions, P implies T,, P implies T,... are not always, perhaps not usually, stated thus explicitly and formally. More frequently than not the procedure is to state the postulates P, then to deduce therefrom an implicate or theorem T, and thereupon to enunciate T as 'proved', the assertion, P implies T, being omitted as a thing understood without formal enunciation. But, if the author of such a discourse be suitably interrogated, he will say: "I have not asserted, nor have I proved or tried to prove, P to be true; I have not asserted, nor have I proved or tried to prove, T to be true; what I have proved, and what I have asserted, if not formally and explicitly, then at least implicitly, is the proposition, P implies T. The establishment of such propositions has been, properly speaking, my sole aim and achievement. All else in my discourse is but auxiliary, incidental, subsidiary." Just as a propositional function has the form of a proposition without being one, so a doctrinal function has the form of a doctrine without being one. For the propositions constituting a doctrine must have content, or subject-matter-a doctrine must be about something-but the constituent propositions or propositional functions making up a doctrinal function evidently have not. And just as putting definite values for the variables in a propositional function yields propositions, so by putting definite values for the variables in the postulates of a doctrinal function, we get a doctrine. As before, let P stand for the system of postulates, P',, P, .... , P,. Now suppose the variables in these to be replaced by some definite set of their values. We thus get from P a corresponding system P' of propositions, P',, P, .. • I P', and at the same time from T., T, ... a corresponding system of propositions, 7' 1 T',T ....
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These propositions have content, or subject-matter, namely, that of the values by which the variables were replaced. The categorical propositions, P P'*, I P'k, T',, T' ... constitute a doctrine-we may call it categorical -about that subject-matter. This doctrine is a value of the categorical doctrinal function, 11 F, ... , P;, T 1 , T,..., and is a proper value of it provided the substituted values are verifiers of the postulates. The hypothetical propositions, P' implies T' 1 , P' implies T%, . .. constitute a doctrine-we may call it hypothetical-about the same subject-matter. This doctrine is a value of the hypothetical doctrinal function, P implies T,, P implies T_,...., and is a proper value of it provided the values substituted are verifiers" of the postulates. Substitution of another set of values will yield two other doctrines-one of each typeabout a different subject-matter.
It is thus seen that a doctrinal function is a matrix or source of doctrines having the same form as the function. It is convenient to say that a doctrine derived from a doctrinal function in the way indicated is a result of applying the function to some definite kind of subject-matter, or we may say that the doctrine is an intenpretation of the function. In my MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY the name is formally introduced and explained.
YALE LAW JOURNAL Doctrinal Functions Often Constructed and Applied Simultaneously
It is highly important to signalize the fact that the foregoing propositions, P' implies T', P' implies T' 2 , . . . , constituting a doctrine, are, as assertions of implication, identical with the propositions, P implies T 1 , P implies T 2 , . . ., constituting the doctrinal function. "Identical" for the reason that implication, as I must again repeat, depends solely on form, and that all the forms involved in the former case are identical with those of the latter. The fact signalized renders possible a certain notable and fairly frequent practice among builders of doctrinal functions. I mean the often obfuscating and misleading practice in which a doctrinal function is both constructed and applied to some subject-matter at one and the same time, as if the two deeds were one, and in such a way that a reader gets the impression that he is witnessing the construction, not of a doctrinal function, but of a doctrine, although he is in fact witnessing both at once. An instance of that practice is the work of Hilbert, which I have already cited so often. What Hilbert has there set up is, primarily and fundamentally, a doctrinal function, one of whose many values is the doctrine familiarly called Euclidean geometry. But while building up the function Hilbert at the same time applies it to geometric subject-matter-a fact shown by his use of certain geometric figures. Because the reader's attention is thus concentrated upon the rising structure of the geometric doctrine he perceives but dimly or not at all the simultaneously rising structure of the doctrinal function, of which the geometric doctrine is but one of countless values. And his false impression is, unfortunately, confirmed by Hilbert's calling his book The Foundations ot Geometry, a flagrant misnomer since it has, essentially, no more to do with geometry than with a thousand other matters-a fact exhibited with ample detail in my Mathematical Philosophy. If an author, when building a doctrinal function, is at the same time applying it to some kind of subject-matter and thereby setting up a doctrine, how is the fact made manifest to a reader'? It is done, not by definition of the subject-matter but by description of it, and such description may be implicit or explicit or both. Hilbert's use of geometric figures is a kind of implicit description of the meanings he was attaching to his variables, or undefined terms. Euclid resorted both to that device and to explicit description' (which he unfortunately and misleadingly called definition) of the meanings he was giving to his undefined terms, or variables. The subject-matter of any doctrine is indicated, never by definition, but only by description of some sort. There is no other way. All discourse, if it have content, is dis-
course about something which, though partially described, is ultimately undefined.
A Word aboz the-Evolution. of Metlod for Gaining and Formulating Knowledge
Why is it that the practice above described and exemplified is, despite its ultimate disadvantages, so common? It is common because, at all stages of intellectual culture, save the most critical, the practice is a natural one. It is natural because by nature, most men, perhaps all men, are more interested in the concrete and particular than in the abstract and general, more sensitive to psychological meaning than to logical relationship, more responsive to propositional content or subject-matter than to pure propositional form, and hence more drawn to propositions and doctrines than to propositional functions and doctrinal functions. Compared with propositions and doctrines in respect of nearness and warmth, propositional and doctrinal functions are felt to be remote and glacial, and one readily understands why it is that, as instruments for gaining and formulating knowledge, they came vividly into consciousness and deliberate use but recently. Indeed Euclid's Elencnts appeared only yesterday and yet it is the first outstanding example of a well-wrought doctrinal function and even it is disguised by wearing the appearance of being only a doctrine, a geometry. Indeed it is questionable whether Euclid himself was aware of the fact that, in building his geometric doctrine, he was really engaged in building a doctrinal function having that doctrine as merely one of its many proper values.
In the long course of the evolution of Method for gaining and formulating knowledge one may say with a good deal of confidence, I believe, that there have been several successive periods of methodological development which may be distinguished or characterized, very roughly, as follows:
I. It seems very probable that there was first of all a purely Empirical period, a period mainly marked by the fact that human beings then gained knowledge, or what they deemed to be knowledge, solely by means of observation, memory, comparison, and the like, without formal reasoning, without strictly logical deduction, without use of the great relation of logical implication, which, as we have seen, holds between pure propositional forms, binding them indissolubly into systems thereof. It is convenient to call such knowledge, or seeming knowledge, empirical, and its articulations empirical propositions. These were categorical, saying, with or without the use of the if-then form, that such-and-such is the case. They naturally associated themselves in groups according as they dealt with this or that
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or another subject. The empirical propositions thus clustering about a given subject-hunting, say, or herds or demons or death or family or tribe or war, etc.-constituted a kind of rudimentary 'doctrine' about that subject. That in the early life of mankind there actually was such a period of pure empiricism, perhaps a very long period, is apt, I think, to seem highly probable to any one who attentively observes the more primitive of his own knowledge-gaining processes, those of other men and women, and especially those of unschooled children and of primitive peoples as revealed in such a work as Sumner and Keller's Science of Society.
II. At length some one came who had the acumen to perceive that the empirical propositions A, B, C, . . . , constituting some empirical rudimentary 'doctrine', were not independent, but that, if (say) A and B were true, then C was true; that, if C were false, then A or B was false; that, in other words, as we now say, C was logically implied by A and B and so was deducible from them. That discovery was a most momentous event in the evolution of knowledge-gaining method. It inaugurated a new era, destined to be endless. That marvelous insight got itself multiplied and extended; some of the rudimentary 'doctrines', more and more of them, ceased to be purely empirical, for some of their constituent propositions were seen to be tied together by a new kind of bond-the unbreakable thread of logical im-.plication. The process, slow, halting, long, continued till it culminated in the insight of some one who had the genius to say: "Since, as we know, some of the propositions of such-and-such an empirical 'doctrine' imply some of the rest, it may be that there are a few of them that, taken together, imply all of the rest. And we must find out whether that is sometimes the case." III. And the answer was found, only the other day, in the time of Euclid in whose Elements it was shown that a small number of propositions implied not only all the then empirically known propositions of geometry but also many not thus known. So began the great period of development of such hypothetical and categorical doctrines as I have characterized in a previous section. The concept of doctrinal function had not yet emerged clearly into consciousness. I have already said that Euclid was probably not aware of the fact that, when constructing his geometric doctrine, he was at the same time building a doctrinal function of which his doctrine was but one of many values, Men then believed, as most men still believe, that the possibility of such a doctrine was due, not to the method employed, but to some favorable peculiarity of the subject-matter dealt with. And they wondered whether there were other subject-matters admitting of like handling. It was generally believed that there were not. But Spinoza had a deeper and truer instinct and he sought, somewhat prematurely, to apply the postulational method to Ethics. EIis partial failure had, unfortunately, the effect of confirming lesser men in their scepticism respecting the method's general availability.
IV. Today we know better. The present is the age, or the beginning of the age, of the doctrinal function. We know today that no one can erect a hypothetical doctrine without at the same time consciously or unconsciously erecting a doctrinal function of the hypothetical type. We know that, though it is sometimes difficult, it is always possible to construct a doctrinal function that will be applicable to any prescribed kind whatever of subject-matter; and we know that any given doctrine, whether hypothetical or categorical, is but one of many values of some actual or potential doctrinal function. These facts will become more and more evident in the course of our further discussion.
The Respective R61es of Deduction and Observation
In the work of constructing a doctrinal function what are the means employed? It is, no doubt, sufficiently obvious that the means are many-observation, memory, imagination, conception, invention, expeientation, etc. But we must on no account fail to note that among all the means employed there is one that is supreme: I refer to Deduction, all the other means being but auxiliary, subsidiary, subordinate thereto.
There is, however, another question to be asked regarding means. Supposing a doctrinal function-to have been constructed, what are the means for applying it to subject-matter-for ascertaining, that is, its proper values-for determining the true doctrines derivable from it by substituting verifiers of its postulates for the variables in these? Such verifiers are not given -they have to be found. In the work of discovering them what are the means employed? It is again evident, as in the previous case, that the means are many. And we have again to note that among all the means there is one that is supreme: this time I refer to Observation, all the others being but auxiliary, subsidiary, subordinate thereto.
We may briefly summarize by saying that the laws are: (1) no Deduction, no Doctrinal Function; (2) no Observation, no true Doctrine.
M1'athenwztics a~zd Scioaicc
The reader has doubtless surmised that in the foregoing I have been really speaking of Mathematics and of Science without using their names. The surmise is just. The discussion has at length conducted us to a position where we may, I think, dis-cern very clearly the essential nature of mathematics, the essential nature of science, the radical distinction between the two great coordinate enterprises, their respective scopes, and the ways in which they are interrelated and enabled to cooperate. In the light of what has been thus far said in this paper, the following succinct statements touching mathematics and science will, I believe, be found to be not only readily intelligible but just and helpful.
The familiar phrase, an established proposition, will occur and recur. By it I shall not mean a proposition absolutely known to be true. "Absolute certainty," as I have elsewhere said, "is a privilege of uneducated minds-and fanatics. It is, for scientific folk, an unattainable ideal." By an 'established' proposition, I shall mean one supported by the general consensus of opinion among experts in the field or subject to which the proposition belongs. I need hardly say that a proposition may be an established one for a period of time and then cease to be such, for the history of thought affords many examples of the fact.
The reader is requested to observe carefully the parallel between the statements now to be made about mathematics and those to be subsequently made about science.
(1) Regarded as an enterprise Mathematics-sheer mathematics, I mean, and not its applications-has for its characteristic aim the establishment of doctrinal functions of the hypothetical type.
(2) A mathematical proposition is an established hypothetical proposition, and is always a constituent of some actual or potential doctrinal function of the hypothetical type.
(3) Regarded as a body of achievements mathematics, at any given date, comprises all and only such mathematical propositions as are then extant, and so it embraces all such established doctrinal functions ot hypothetical type, or parts thereof, as then exist.
(4) Mathematical method consists of all the means available for use in establishing hypothetical propositions. Among all such means Deduction is sovereign-sovereign in the sense that without deduction no mathematics whatever would be possible.
(5) Every question that mathematics endeavors to answer is essentially of the form: If such-and-such statements be true, then what additional statements are, by logical necessity, also true? So we see that, in the sense indicated, the field of mathematics is the field of questions about the world of logical Possibility.
And now respecting Science I ought, ideally, to say, as the reader can hardly fail to perceive, and, were the time ripe for it, I would say: Regarded as an enterprise Science-sheer science and not its applications-has for its characteristic aim the es- [Vol. 41 tablishment of doctrinal functions of the categorical type. But the time is not yet ripe, for, though many such functions exist, since (as I have before pointed out) one of them has been built whenever one of the hypothetical type has been built, yet men of science have paid them little or no heed, being in fact hardly aware of their existence or even their possibility. What men of science have been interested in is, not categorical doctrinal functions, but categorical doctrines, and they have not yet advanced to the critical point of perceiving that any such doctrine is merely a proper value of some doctrinal function, much less that it is but one among many such proper values. On that account I have decided to compromise here, to step down from the top of the ladder to the first rung below it and define as follows:
(1') Regarded as an enterprise Science has for its characteristic aim the establishment of categorical doctrines.
(2') A scientific proposition is an established categorical proposition, and is always a constituent of an actual or potential categorical doctrine.
(3') Regarded as a body of achievements science, at any given date, comprises all and only such scientific propositions as are then extant, and so it embraces all such categorical doctrines, or parts thereof, as then exist.
(4') Scientific method consists of all the means available for use in establishing categorical propositions. Among such means Observation is sovereign-sovereign in the sense that without observation science would be impossible.
(5') Every question that science endeavors to answer is essentially of the form: What are the facts regarding the properties or relations of such-and-such a part or aspect of what is, not merely possible, but actual? So it is seen that the field of science is the field of all questions about the Actual world, whether living or non-living, organic or inorganic, material or immaterial, physical or psychical.
About Applications of Matkenatics
Mathematics, as we have seen, consists of hypothetical doctrinal functions and parts thereof. It follows that any application of such a function to subject-matter is an application of mathematics to that subject-matter. Such applications ought never to be confused, as they commonly and harmfully are, with mathematics itself. In order that I may be quite clear in this matter, I beg the reader will indulge me in a little repetition. As before, let P be a system of postulates, P,, P_, . . . , P1,; let T,, T,... be their implicates or theorems; suppose the postulates to be verifled, thereby the T's are also verified; let P' be the resulting set of true propositions, P',, P' 2 ,... , P'I, corresponding to the
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YALE LAW JOURNAL P's; and let T', T'., ... be the resulting true propositions corresponding to the T's. Now consider the following four bodies:
(1) The body of propositions, P implies T 1 , P implies T,...
(2) The body of propositional functions, P, P,
The body of propositions, P' implies T', P' implies T',, (3) ; (1) is a hypothetical doctrinal function-an integral part of sheer mathematics; (3) is a hypothetical doctrine resulting from applying (1) -from applying mathematics-to subject-matter through verification; it is not sheer mathematics but an application thereof; (3) has the same form as (1) but, unlike (1), it is a doctrine because its impliers and implicates have content or subject-matter and it is a true doctrine because the content is a verifying content; (3) is one of many proper values of (1) ; (1) is established by Deduction but (3) is got from (1) by Observation, for without observation verification is impossible.
Next compare (2) and (4) ; (2) is a categorical propositional function, and, except for the complomise above made, it should be called an integral part of sheer science, and then (4), a categorical doctrine, would be consistently called an application of (2) to subject-matter through verification; but, in virtue of that practically necessary but logically infernal compromise, we say that (4) is an integral part of sheer science, and by 'applications' of science we shall have to mean its uses in medicine, for example, or engineering, or the like; to establish any proposition of (4) demands observation unless it be known, as it may not be, that the P"s imply the T"s, in which case it suffices to extend verifying observation to the P"s only.
The Scope of Science aind the Scope of Mathematics
In the nomencliture of scientific methodology there is probably no more important term than Definition, and there is certainly no term more commonly, harmfully and shamelessly abused. The distinction between definition and description is almost universally unrecognized or ignored. Yet the difference between them is grave, fundamental, radical. Any true statement about a thing is a partial description of it, but to define the thing it is necessary to indicate some mark belonging to it and to nothing else. The endeavors of scientific men to tell what science is have produced a pretty extensive literature. It abounds in partial descriptions of what the various writers have variously meant by science, and these descriptions, often insightful and light- [Vol. 41 giving, are endlessly diversified and are frequently incompatible; but in that literature one will search in vain for any thing that may be rightly called a definition of Science, much less a definition of it that has approved itself as authoritative or standard. Unless and until we know what we mean by science there can be little or no use talking of the scope of science. That is one of the reasons why in a preceding section I was at so much pains to construct a genuine definition of the term.
It is evident that according to that definition the scope of science-not as a dated body of achievements but as an enterprise-excludes no element or aspect of the Actual world. In other words, no matter whether a given thing be material or immaterial, physical or psychical, objective or subjective, human or non-human, societal or non-societal, if it be such that it is significant-meaningful, not meaningless-to ask whether it has such-and-such properties or stands in such-and-such relation, then that thing is a fit subject for scientific investigation and falls within the scope of science. The conception is broad. It obviously embraces not only the subject-matters of the so-called physical sciences but also those of law, economics, history, ethics, anthropology, philosophy, political theory, and sociology. It is frequently said-said, moreover, by men who ought to know better and who would know better if they reflected upon the matter maturely-that the scope of science, rightly understood, excludes the so-called moral or social sciences. The assertion is made chiefly on the alleged ground that workers in the so-called social sciences, because unable to employ Experimentation as in the laboratories of certain physical sciences, cannot arrive at trustworthy conclusions. In response to that criticism I venture to repeat here a part of what I have said elsewhere. "In the technical laboratory-sense of the term, experimentation is, when practicable, often of great value; in the ease of many problems, it is indeed indispensable; but it not so in all. The laboratory meaning of the term is much too narrow.
"For an ideal experiment, were such a thing possible, would be one performed under completely known conditions; but the thing is not possiblegenuine ideals can be endlessly approximated but can never be reached. Knowledge of conditions is a variable, and it has two limits: an upper limitconditions completely known-and a lower limit-conditions completely unknown. Neither of the limits is ever attained-all experimentation whatsoever occurs between them-below the upper limit and above the lower limit. It is inexpedient, quite unfair and purely wilful to draw a narrow circle about the upper limit and say that experiments inside the circle are cientific and that those outside are not. The range between the limits is vast, and we may even say significantly that the whole life of mankind through the ages has been a long manifold experiment in the art of living in the world.
See (1') especially, but also (2'), (3') and (4'), at page 735, supra.
"Moreover we must not lose sight of the fact that, among the means constituting scientific method, experimentation is, even at its best, only a highly useful servant of the king, and the king is Observation." 0 And now we must ask: What is the scope of mathematics -of sheer mathematics as distinguished from its applications? From what has been said it is clear that to ask that question is the same as asking: What is the scope of postulational thinking? Or, again, What is the scope of doctrinal functions of the hypothetical type? And the answer is: The scope of mathematics -not as a dated body of achievements but as an enterprisecoincides with the field of the relation called Logical Implication. That unique relation is perhaps the austerest and most powerful among all the relations known to the human intellect, and its field is vast, immeasurably vast. We know that the number and variety of propositional functions-pure propositional forms -is endless. We know that these forms are not all of them independent but that, on the contrary, a properly selected small set of them serve to imply, not indeed all the rest, far from it, but an infinitude of them; that another small set imply another infinitude; and so on. Therein resides the possibility of erecting those majestic mathematical edifices whch I have named doctrinal functions of the hypothetical type. A good many of these have been already constructed, and others are in process of construction. What of the future? Is there a finite limit to the possible number of such edifices? There is every indication that no such limit exists. But, if there be such a limit, it might, conceivably, be actually reached after the lapse of a finite time.
In that event, deduction as a living process would be extinct; mathematics would no longer expand; as an enterprise having attained its aim, it would cease to be; nevertheless, as a body of achievements, mathematics would continue to exist for study, for admiration, for instrumental use in science, and for endlessly progressive application to all the diverse subject-matters found in the actual world.
In virtue of the foregoing considerations it is clear, I hope, and quite noteworthy, that, taken together, the enterprise of Science and the enterprise of Mathematics embrace the whole knowledge-seeking activity of mankind, where by "knowledge" is meant the kind of knowledge that admits of being made articulate in the form of propositions. The restriction is designed to guard against what would else be the possibility of my being thought to forget or to ignore the noetic power of sheer artistic sensibility. 
The R61e of Doctrinal Functions in Rational Thought
At the beginning of this article I stated that it aims to answer two questions. The first of these has now been answered pretty fully. The second, though it too has been answered in part, demands further consideration. It requires to be answered both more fully and more explicitly. In dealing with it I shall be mainly, though not quite exclusively, concerned with doctrinal functions of the hypothetical type. Inasmuch as such functions are the characteristic product of thorough-going postulational thinking, our question is virtually equivalent to this: What is the r6le of postulational thinking in man's endeavors to understand the possible and the actual worlds? And again, because sheer mathematics aims at the establishment of hypothetical doctrinal functions, we may, if we like, conceive our question to be this: What is the r8le of sheer mathematics in the life of reason? Lest some reader shy at the appearance here of the term mathematics, I hasten to add that the r~le in question will be found to be immensely greater than that of 'mathematics' as this term has been traditionally, and still is commonly and uncritically, understood.
Let us recognize that our entire discussion has been concerned with certain ideuls. The concept of a doctrinal function, whether of the hypothetical or of the categorical type, is the concept of an ideal; the concept of a hypothetical or of a categorical doctrine as a proper value of a corresponding function is the concept of another ideal. These kindred ideals obviously belong at once both to the methodology of research and to the art of formulating and communicating knowledge. Like every other genuine ideal, they are not goals-posts to be reached-but are perfections to be endlessly pursued, to be more and more nearly approximated, though never quite attained.
The process of approximating them is a secular process. It began, no doubt, in the remotest human past-in the very beginning of that prehistoric period which I have called the period of pure empiricism-and it has continued to operate, with greater and greater strength, on down through the intervening ages of man's increasing endeavors to understand, by means of Observation and Logic, the two-fold world of the Actual and the Possible. Yet even today realization of the two great ideals has reached a close approximation in only a few instances, where circumstance or subject-matter has been especially favorable, as in geometly, for example. Nevertheless the movement has been universal; it has been going on, I mean, in all fields of intellectual activity, though in some of them the process has been for the most part quite unconscious, as if men were literally driven upward along the steep endless way towards perfection by a half-blind, infinitely patient, untiring cosmic urge. When to that stress is added the lure of the ideals themselves, once these are understood, and their advintages and beauty are seen, the pace of approximation is greatly accelerated.
One should, therefore, expect to find that the r6le of doctrinal functions in rational thought is everywhere discernibly present in the literature of such thought, conspicuously and dominantly present in rare instances, but for the most part only in embryonic form, in rudimentary fashion, as if, against great difficulties, it were slowly struggling into existence from some deep impulsion native in the very constitution of intellect itself. And the expectation is realized.
The few almost dazzlingly bright examples of well-nigh complete realization of the ideals are familiar and need not detain us. It will profit us more to look for the r8le in question in fields where, because the subject-matters are far less tractable, precision and cogency of thinking are far more difficult to attain.
And first a fairly obvious remark about rational discourse in general. In a previous section I signalized the very significant fact that in any average specimen of reasoned, or ostensibly reasoned, discourse, most of the statements purporting to be propositions are not propositions, but, in virtue of their undefined terms, or variables, are propositional functions. Commonly there is present at least some show, frequently very inadequate, of proving some of them, of deducing them, that is, from others, and so there is a semblance of some of the statements being postulates and of others being theorems, though quite without any clear or formal indication of such a division. The author of the discourse regards it as the setting forth of a true doctrine. Of course he is mistaken. It can be no doctrine at all, whether true or false, unless and until definite meanings have been assigned to its variables. What, then, is it? Evidently it presents the physiognomy of a doctrinal function, albeit an ill-conceived, very immature, badly fabricated one. Because it is taken for a doctrine and because, as often happens, its variables are represented by prejudice-arousing, emotion-stirring terms, it engenders endless controversy. Is such a discourse, then, worse than worthless? No doubt such is frequently the case. But, when it is, it is not due to the functional features of it. It is due to the fact that, regarded as a function, it is so very incomplete, so badly bungled, so slovenly built. The lesson of it is a lesson regarding the nature of our minds: our intellects are such that they cannot seriously undertake the production of rational discourse without availing themselves, in at least some measure, of the frame and manner of postulational thinking, and in the product there is always detectible, in at least rude outline, the pattern of a doctrinal function. Let us glance at some instances.
Consider, for example, our American Declaration of Independence. Here the presence of the pattern is so evident as scarcely to need pointing out. It is indeed slightly disguised by the fact that, in accord with the regnant plilosophy of that time, the Declaration's postulates were held to be "self-evident truths," just as in that day the axioms of geometry were regarded as self-evident. The disguise, however, is thin, for today we see very clearly that the office of those so-called "self-evident truths" was nothing but the office of a certain set of political postulates. In these the undefined terms, or variables, are so conspicuous as to require no specification. Having laid down their postulates, the authors, by means of a grave argument involving citation of many great abuses, proceeded to deduce andto enunciate, among many fairly deducible but there undeduced implicates, one momentous theorem, to the effect that it was not only the right but the duty of the Colonies to separate from the mother country and to establish an independent government of their own.
For another example belonging to the field of the social sciences, take the Constitution of the United States. The articles of the Constitution are the postulates; the theorems are the unexpressed assertions that the various great ends specified in the preamble will be attained; the arguments designed to prove the assertions of implication of the attainability of these ends are found in the debates attending the construction and ratification of the instrument. In a nut shell, it is as if the framers had said: If these various articles be adopted, then, as our reasonings prove, such-and-such stated purposes will be realized. Obviously we have here a striking example of general conformation to the pattern of postulational thinking, and in the result of it, since major terms are undefined and so are variables, we have, in skeletal form, a doctrinal function of hypothetical type. Similar examples abound. A familiar one is the classic Political Economy of Ricardo, basing itself upon a set of broad assumptions and deducing therefrom as from a system of postulates -with much less, however, than mathematical rigor-a body of conclusions or theorems, that had the fortune to be treated as 'established' propositions for some generations.
A very recent and much better example, in the field of the preceding one, is found in Jacques Rueff's brilliant book, Dcs Sciences Physiques aux Scienwes Morales, -where, in a weighty chapter concerned with political economy, the author carefully lays down a small number of postulates (called axioms by him) and then deduces from them, with scrupulous regard for logical rigor, a series of important conclusions. It is notable that M. Rueff quite rightly calls these conclusions "theorems," for the term theorem, when properly used, signifies, not a mathematical proposition, p implies q, but only the implicate q.
Turning for a moment to biology one readily sees that in the Darwinian theory of evolution, such familiar principles as 'spontaneous generation', 'struggle for existence', 'survival of the fittest', and a few other assumptions, were designed to render, the service of postulates, being thought to imply the occurrence of the main facts observed in the development of organic life.
I have already alluded to the somewhat premature, not very successful, yet truly magnificant attempt of Spinoza to erect a theory of Ethics patterned after the postulational method of Euclidean geometry. In this connection it is highly edifying to see both that and how M. Rueff, in his above-cited work, has demonstrated that, among known types of ethics, there is none to which postulational thinking is inapplicable.
Professor R. D. Carmichael's Theory of Relativity is a notable contribution to the movement by which even the most recent developments in physics are being gradually shaped to the form of a doctrinal function. Here I must pause a moment to commend strongly to students of legal science Professor Carmichael's recently published Logic of Discovery in which the role of the doctrinal function in research and in the formulation of results is discussed very understandingly and helpfully.
Perhaps I ought to refer here to my previous article On the Study of Legal Science.," in which I have signalized both the desirability and especially the feasibility of applying the method of postulational thinking not only to each of the branches of law but also to the law itself viewed as a whole.
To extend the list of citations would not be difficult but it seems needless. It is, I think, now sufficiently evident that, as before said, our intellects, in whatever field they specialize, do in fact, no matter why, tend to avail themselves, at first unconsciously, then consciously, then more and more consciously and deliberately, of the processes that lead inevitably and ultimately to the construction and establishment of doctrinal functions.
Some of the Reasons Why
I have emphasized the long, slow, often unconscious, seemingly inevitable, secular development of postulational thinking in course of the evolution of knowledge-seeking methods and of the arts of formulating and communicating knowledge. Before closing I must try to indicate explicitly some of its vindicating virtues, some of the peculiar benefits or advantages that accrue from its use, sustain it, and continually accelerate the speed of its conquering march. One of them, and not the least one, is esthetic. The human intellect is, in its deepest nature, in its heart of heart, an artist. A well-wrought doctrinal function of major kind-a majestic and indestructible Form of forms, "poised in eternal calm" above the changeful things of the sensuous world-affords in the contemplation of it the peculiar delight of a great work of art. Such a function or any like-formed proper value of it is indeed a work of art of the highest order. Not of sensuous art, for it is not heard, like poetry or music, nor seen, like painting or sculpture or architecture. Its inner harmony and the qualities of its structure and form are not shown in solar light-they are revealed only in psychic light, to the infinitely delicate sensibility of the pure understanding. The builder of a doctrinal function owns the authority of the austerest of the muses-the Muse of Logical Rigor-and the product of his craftsmanship is a work of art, but the art is supersensuous.
Another of the benefits of postulational thinking is the instrumental service rendered by it to science. We have seen that postulational thinking establishes none but hypothetical propositions (in answer to questions about the world of possibility) ; that science establishes none but categorical propositions (in response to questions about the actual world) ; that the former is done by Deduction, and the latter by Observation. Though neither deduction nor observation can take the other's place, they can cooperate: each can help the other in the other's task. And this reciprocal service is of three closely kindred but distinct kinds. Let us glance at them.
Without the help of postulational thinking science would be purely empirical; the group of propositions constituting a branch thereof would have none but a kind of psychological unity due to their clustering about some particular subject; for mere observation can tie no logical knots. If, then, today a branch of science has some logical unity, if some of its propositions are known to be implicates of others, science is wholly indebted for that kind of increasing organization to the help given by her sister enterprise, postulational thinking.
Again, let us suppose that by the mentioned kind of help all of the established propositions of some scientific branch have been found to be deducible from a set of postulates. Note what happens. It is that the postulates are found to imply zczo propositions. These have to be tested-tested by observation. Thus we see that deduction, postulational thinking, serves to show observation where to look and what to look for. Note, too, in passing, how handsomely observation requites her benefactor. In most cases it happens sooner or later that at least one of the "new" propositions is found by observation to be invalid, or false. Thereupon postulational thinking is instantly confronted with a new task-that of so altering the postulates that the false proposition shall not be among their implicates.
Once more. A man of science makes a guess at the cause or the law or the necessary and sufficient conditions for a group of seemingly related phenomena. The guess, commonly dignified with the name 'scientific hypothesis', requires to be tested by obsevation applied to the logical consequences of the hypothesis. Prior to such a validity test the consequences have to be ascertained. This has to be done in the only available way, namely, by deduction, which treats the 'scientific hypothesis', not as a content-bearing proposition, but as a postulate, as a mere implier, as a sheer propositional form.,
In closing, I wish barely to mention two further considerations touching the merits of postulational thinking. One of them relates to the art of logical criticism; the other to what might, with some propriety, be called the psycho-analysis of discourse.
"La critique," said Cousin, "est la vie de la science." It will hardly be disputed, I think, that a discourse never gets examined quite so thoroughly as when its author or reader critically compares its structure with the universal pattern of doctrinal functions, namely: primitive (undefined) terms, or variables; derived (defined) terms, or constants; primitive (unproved) propositional forms, or postulates'; derived (proved) propositional forms, implicates, or theorems.
The final consideration is this: In proportion as one is well bred in the ways of postulational thinking one becomes vividly aware of the fact that within or under every species of discourse, except such as has been thoroughgoingly postulationalized, there lurk obscure or even completely hidden assumptions or postulates; that these, being employed quite unconsciously, are often more effective than conscious reasoning itself in determining attitudes, theses, and conclusions; that, on every account, such hidden determinants of life, conduct, and thought ought to be dragged forth from their hiding places into the light; and that, therefore, the disciplining of men, women, and children in the art of "postulate detection," as I have called it in my booklet on Thinking about Thinking, is an unsurpassed obligation of education in all of its subjects and at every stage.
